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ABSTRACT 
This paper argues that government policy in Africa tends to 
produce a harsh economic environment for the producers of agricultural 
products, and that a major effect may well be declines in agricultural 
production in that continent. Government bureaucracies control 
agricultural markets and set prices within them. Commercial policy is 
manipulated in ways that adversely affect the incomes of farmers. 
Pricing policies tend to be low price policies. A variety of 
pressures -- some deriving from the need for taxes and foreign 
exchange; others from political pressures brought to bear by organized 
interests drive these policy choices. But the general result is a 
weakening of the incentives for agriculture. 
The Regulation of Rural Markets in Africa 
Ro bert H .  Bates 
Introduction 
African societies are largely agrarian. In most African 
economies, agriculture generates nearly 50 percent of the gross 
domestic product and employs more than 70 percent of the la bor force. 
Agriculture provides nearly one-third of Africa's merchandise exports; 
prior to the discovery of oil in Africa, it provided nearly two­
thirds. 
Farming in Africa remains over whelmingly in private hands. 
Perhaps the most intense attempt at socialized production took place 
in Nkrumah's Ghana in the 1 960s. But Dodson's careful study of that 
effort reveals that at no point did more than one percent of the 
production of any given crop originate in the pu blic sector. 1 African 
agriculture is dominated by small-scale family farms. 
Nonetheless, government intervention is a significant factor 
in the economics of African agriculture. While occasionally taking 
the form of pu blic production, it more commonly takes the form of 
market intervention. This paper will study the forms of market 
intervention engaged in by African governments and analyze their 
impact on the incentives faced by private producers of agricultural 
products. 
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Export Agriculture 
It is useful to distinguish between two kinds of agricultural 
commodities: food crops, many of which could be directly consumed on 
the farm, and cash crops, fe w of which are directly consumable and 
which are instead marketed as a source of cash income. Many cash 
crops are in fact exported; they provide not only a source of cash 
incomes for farm families but also a source of foreign exchange for 
the national economies of Africa. The major export crops include: 
Beverages: coffee, tea and cocoa 
Vegeta ble oils: palm oil, palm kernels, cotton seed and groundnuts 
Fi bers: cotton and sisal 
Others: sugar, bananas, to bacco, ru b ber, maize, hides and skins 
An important feature of the African economies is the nature of 
the marketing systems employed for the purchase and exportation of 
these crops. The crops are grown by private farm families. But they 
are then sold through official, state -controlled marketing channels. 
At the local level, these channels may take the form of licensed 
agents or registered private buyers; they may also take the form of 
cooperative societies or farmers' associations. But the regulated 
nature of the marketing system is clearly revealed in the fact that 
these primary purchasing agencies can in most cases sell to but one 
purchaser: a state-owned body, commonly known as a marketing board. 
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Background 
The origins of these boards are diverse. In some cases, 
particularly in the former settler territories, they were formed by 
farmers themselves . Commercial farmers banded together in efforts to 
"sta bilize" the markets for cash crops; in effect, with the support of 
the colonial states which they dominated, they sought to create 
producer -dominated cartels .2 More commonly, the origins of the 
marketing boards lay in an alternative source of cartel formation: in 
the efforts of the purchasers and exporters of cash crops to dominate 
the markets and to force lower prices on farmers.
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In either case, it was World War I I  which led to the 
institutionalization of the regulation of export markets . During the 
war, Britain sought to procure agricultural commodities and raw 
materials from her colonial dependencies. Some materials, such as 
food for troops in North Africa, were needed for the war effort; 
others were needed to generate foreign exchange for the purchase of 
armaments from North America; and the purchase of still other goods 
was required to provide prosperity for the colonial areas and there by 
to lessen the likelihood of political insta bility at a time in which 
British forces were already spread perilously thin. To secure the 
regularized purchase of raw materials, the British government created 
a Ministry of Supply. The ministry signed bulk purchasing agreements 
with the colonial governments in each of the African territories.4 And 
to administer the terms of these agreements, the colonial authorities 
created official state marketing agencies . In those territories where 
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large -scale producers had already begun to operate "market 
sta bilizing" schemes, the organizations running these schemes were 
essentially recruited full-scale to staff and administer the state 
marketing boards,5 In the territories where purchasers' cartels held a 
predominance of market power, the state procurement schemes 
essentially gave a legal framework for the merchant - based cartels; the 
cartels became the instruments for securing raw materials.6 
In either case, upon independence, many African governments 
found themselves the inheritors of bureaucracies which held a legal 
monopoly over the purchase and export of commodities in the most 
valua ble sector of their domestic economies. These new states 
possessed extremely powerful instruments of market intervention. They 
could purchase export crops at an administratively set, low domestic 
price; they could then market these crops at the prevailing world 
price; and they could accumulate the revenues generated by the 
difference between the domestic and world prices for these 
commodities, A central question thus became: for whose benefit were 
the funds to be employed? 
Government Taxation 
Initially, the revenues were to be kept in the form of a price 
assistance fund and used for the benefit of the farmers. At times of 
low international prices, they were to be employed to support domestic 
prices and so shelter the farmers from the vagaries of the world 
market, In the case of the Western Nigerian marketing board, for 
5 
example, 70 percent of the board's revenues were to be retained for 
such purposes. But commitments to employ the funds for the benefit of 
the farmers proved short -lived. They were overborn by am bitions to 
implement development programs and by political pressures brought to 
bear upon goverments from non-agricultural sectors of the economy. 
One example is the Cotton Price Assistance Fund, accumulated 
by the Lint Marketing Board in Uganda. While employed to sta bilize 
prices in the 1 9 50s, it was increasingly used thereafter for other 
purposes. In the pre -Independence period, for example, it was used to 
secure revenues for the building of the O wen's Falls Dam; while the 
fund purchased shares in the Uganda Electricity Board � the agency 
responsi ble for the dam - - it has received no dividends from these 
shares (and they have declined in value). In the 1 960s, the fund 
"loaned" 100 million Ushs. to the government for investment in the 
capital budget, interest free! Still later, it was employed to 
capitalize the Cooperative Development Bank with a t welve million 
Ushs. contri bution, again interest free, repaya ble over 35 years. 7 
Similar patterns appear to characterize the use of the Coffee Price 
Assistance Fund in Uganda, a fact that led one commission of inquiry 
to state: 
To the extent that huge sums of money were diverted to other 
industries at the farmers' costly sacrifice, the wrath and 
indignation of the farmer is understanda ble and must be 
sympathized with. In saying this we are not una ware that in a 
developing country like ours where sustained growth must, to some 
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extent, depend on the country's a bility to effect 
diversification, financial resources must of necessity cross the 
boundary of economic sectors. The important consideration should 
not, however, veil the equally important natural fact that human 
sacrifice is not inexhausta ble. It is our view, therefore, that 
it was not fair to exact from the coffee grower the 
disproportionate contri bution he made to the development of other 
industries.8 
Similarly, in West Africa, the revenues of the marketing 
boards were increasingly diverted to uses other than the sta bilization 
of farmers' incomes. In Nigeria, for example, funds were first loaned 
to the regional governments; later, they were given to these 
governments in the form of grants; later still, the legislation 
governing the use of these revenues was altered such that the boards 
became instruments of direct taxation. 9 We have already noted that the 
statutes governing the marketing boards in Western Nigeria reserved 70 
percent of the trading surpluses for price sta bilization; an 
additional 7.5 percent was to be employed for agricultural research 
and the remaining 22.5 percent for general development purposes. But 
Helleiner notes that following self-government: 
The Western Region's 1 9 5 5 - 1 960 development plan announced • •
the a bandonment of the " 70-22. 5 - 7  . 5" formula for distri bution of 
the Western Board's right to contri bute to development, and 
provided for b20 million in loans and grants to come from the 
Board for the use of the Regional Government during the 
plan • • •
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[The Board] was now o bviously intended to run a trading surplus to 
finance the regional Government's program. The Western Region Market­
ing Board had by now become • • •  a fiscal arm of the Western Nigerian 
Government. 10 
This transition was followed as well in Ghana, where "the government 
decided to remove 
of the Board. ,,ll 
• •  legal restrictions on its access to the funds 
The movement from an instrument of price sta bilization, 
largely for the benefit of farmers, to an instrument of taxation, with 
the diversion of revenues to non -farm sectors, can be seen as well in 
changes in the pricing formulas employed by the marketing boards. 
Insofar as the boards were employed to sta bilize producer prices, the 
domestic prices -- i.e. the price offered the farmers - - should have 
moved independently of the world prices; moreover, a policy of price 
sta bilization implies that domestic prices should have at times 
exceeded world prices, as the marketing board attempted to protect 
farmers from falls in the world price. But domestic prices rarely 
exceed world prices. 
The nature of the pricing policy is suggested in the price­
setting methods employed in Uganda in 1981. The annual price setting 
exercise for coffee, cotton and other exports was a matter of state. 
The initial negotiations involved not only the departments involved in 
agriculture - - the Minstry of Agriculture and the Ministry of 
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Cooperatives and Marketing -- but also the Ministry of Finance, whose 
primary concern is with securing government revenues, and the 
governors of the Bank of Uganda, whose primary concern is with 
generating foreign exchange. Negotiations among these parties 
culminated in the formulation of a top-secret document outlining the 
pricing formula for the next agricultural season, a document which was 
then de bated and ratified by the ca binet. 
If the parties to this price setting exercise suggest the 
political nature of pricing policy, then the formula which they 
employed suggests its distri butional impact. In connection with the 
technical experts in the marketing boards, the government f orcast 
on a highly conservative basis -- the world market price for the 
pending crop year. It then deducted from that price the unit cost of 
export marketing (i.e. the costs of the marketing board) and export 
taxes. The costs of crop collection and preliminary processing (i.e. 
the take of the cooperative societies) were then deducted, and the 
balance constituted the price paid out to the farmers. In essence, it 
was the farmers who got the residual share. And it was the farmers 
who a bsor bed all the risks; the proceeds to the government and the 
marketing agencies came off the top and so were guaranteed. 
That this procedure was followed elsewhere is shown by the 
response of the West African governments to the bSO per ton fall in 
the price of cocoa in the early 1 960s. The governments of both Ghana 
and Nigeria passed on the full burden of the drop in price to the 
producers; rather than protecting the producers, they instead acted to 
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stabilize the magnitude of the surpluses which they accumulated from 
them.12 It is also suggested by the analysis undertaken by Bovet and 
Unnevehr in their study of agricultural pricing in Togo.13 The govern-
ment of Togo, they argue, sets export prices as if it were seeking to 
maximize its offtake of revenues from the export industry. Letting N R
stand for net revenues, Q for the quantity of exports, P
L 
for the 
domestic price and PW for world prices, then: 
N R = PWQ 
- P
L
Q = Q(PW 
- PL
). 
If the government seeks to maximize its net revenues, then it will 
choose a domestic price, P
L
' so as to
Max N R  = Q(PW 
- P
L
). 
(P
L) 
Simple calculus yields the first order conditions for thi·s 
maximization: 14 
.lQ. p - .lQ. p - Q = 0 apL 
w aPL L 
p 
Multiplying both sides by ; yields: 
(
.lQ.
 p ) ( ..19.. p 
)
 
apL 
• ; PW -
\a
p
L 
• ; PL - PL o. 
Or, simplifying, 
P
L __!L_ 
p-
=
11+ 1 w 
where 11 the price elasticity of production. 
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Given knowledge of the elasticity of production, then, the government 
could establish a ratio of the local to world price which would 
maximize the revenues it earned from the export of the commodity. On 
the basis of the evidence they collected, Bovet and Unnevehr are 
convinced that the government of Togo is doing just that. As they 
conclude, 
The elasticity of short-term supply was estimated at .Sl. Using 
this elasicity optimal revenue maximizing prices were calculated 
for 1967-76. The results show that [marketing board pricing] 
policies have maximized government revenues.15 
Marketing Cost 
Thus far I have argued that African governments intervene in 
the markets for export crops so as to amass government revenues and 
that they do so by using monopsonistic16 state agencies to depress 
domestic prices below world prices, appropriating the difference in 
the form of state revenues. It is important to realize, however, that 
this form of state intervention in export markets yields an additional 
consequence: an inflation of the costs of marketing. The marketing 
boards themselves come to impose significant costs upon export 
industries. 
11' 
The marketing boards are monopsonies; it is from being so that 
they achieve the market power by which to control export prices. But 
the economic premium they can command as a consequence of this market 
power they can -- and do -- consume in the form of inflated costs. 
Evidence of this is the exhorbitant staffing to which many have become 
accustomed; as noted in one commission of inquiry in Ghana: 
The evidence before us suggests that the [Cocoa Marketing Board] 
used the profits obtained from its monopoly cocoa operations 
to • • • provide funds for the dance band, footballers, actor,s 
and actresses, and a whole host of satellite units and 
individuals. • The C.M.B. 's area of operations • embraces 
activities and involves a staff which would have appeared absurd 
17 only ten years ago. 
Evidence is also contained in the ability of the marketing personnel 
to use their market power to enhance their personal incomes; this too 
was noted in the report of the commission: 
Farmers often referred to the opulence of the Secretary Receivers 
[the officials who operate the local buying stations] . It was 
alleged that these officers who earned bG 180 per annum owned 
cars, trucks, buildings, etc. and often supported as many as 
three wives. We saw some Secretary Receivers owning 
Mercedes • • • 18 
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Similar abuses pervade the upper levels of the marketing 
bureaucracy. Thus recent inquiries into the Cocoa Marketing Board 
suggest the extent to which the directors of the Board divert the 
trading surpluses accumulated from farmers into their own pockets. As 
West Africa reported: 
Commander Addo, former chief executive of the Cocoa Marketing 
Board, retold the committee investigating its affairs that the 
C.M.B. spent nearly Cl m. on drinks alone between August 1977 and 
July 1, 1978. Giving evidence, Commander Addo said during his 
tenure of office he instituted certain measures to boost the 
morale of the directors. As part of these measures, he said, all 
the eight or ten directors were given a bottle each of whisky, 
brandy, and gin at the end of each month in addition to receiving 
a • • •  table allowance.19 
The inefficiency of the boards is thus suggested in the costs 
they impose for providing their marketing services. It is also 
suggested in their inability to tailor their costs to their volume of 
business. The consequence is that unit costs of marketing have 
increased and have done so particularly at times of declining export 
volumes. These trends are illustrated in the figures in table 1 which 
are drawn from the records of the Coffee and Lint Marketing Boards in 
Uganda. 
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TABLE 1: Inflation of Marketing Costs 
Coffee Total Expenditures Quantity of Costs Per Buyer 
Marketing Board CM. Ushs.) Buyers (Ushs.) 
Estimated Actual Estimated Actual 
1974/75 12 4 . 2 114 .6 2 , 861, 399 4 2 .8 4 0 .0 
1975 /76 15 3 .5 80 .6 2 , 4 31, 5 2 4 64 .0 33 . 6  
1976/77 2 61.6 216 .3 2 , 4 4 9, 737 10 4 . 6  90 .1 
1977/78 4 11.6 2 21.3 1, 74 2 , 5 75 2 4 2 . 1  130 .2 
Lint 
Marketing Board 
1975 /76 14 . 0  21. 1 133, 4 68 10 4 .8 138.1 
1976/77 25 .5 17.3 74 , 4 22 34 2 .6 232 . 5 
1977/78 2 6.6 19.1 10 8, 367 2 4 5  .5 176.3 
1978/79 18. 0 13 . o  40 , 0 0 0  45 0 .o 325 .o 
1979/80 17. 9 15 .5 2 2 , 0 0 0  813 .6 70 4 . 5 
Source: From Annual Estimates, Lint Marketing Board; Annual Estimates, 
Coffee Marketing Board. 
The inefficiency of the marketing boards, it should be noted, 
derives not only from their position of market power; it derives as 
well from the fiscal system under which they operate. Characteristic 
is the legislation governing the Coffee Marketing Board in Uganda. As 
noted in the Coffee Marketing Act 
(5 ) If at the end of any year the accounts of the Board reveal a 
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profit on its trading operations • • •  such profit shall be paid 
into the [Coffee Price Assistance] fund within six months of the 
end of that year. 
(6) If at the end of any year the accounts of the Board reveal a 
deficit in its trading operations • • •  the Treasury shall, 
within six months of the end of that year, or as soon thereafter 
as may be practicable, pay to the Board • • •  a sum equal to the 
amount of the deficit.2 0
The purposes underlying this fiscal system are clear: a s  a public 
authority, the Board is not to make a profit; nor is it to run at a 
loss. But in fact the incentives created by the fiscal system, are 
highly perverse. For, by section 6, the Board is protected against 
all cost overruns; under this fiscal system, irrespective of its 
costs, the Board cannot make a loss. Further weakening incentives to 
minimize the costs of marketing are the provisions of section 5 ; 
should the Board operate efficiently and produce a surplus, then, 
under the provisions of this section, any resulting "profits" will be 
seized by the Treasury. The Board therefore does best by inflating 
its costs, for then it can consume any benefits which can be generated 
by its revenues, rather than having these seized by the Treasury; and 
it need not fear consuming at too high a level, for the Treasury must 
cover any losses. Rather than creating incentives to generate trading 
surpluses, then, the fiscal system of the Board instead creates 
incentives to generate higher salaries, inflated payrolls, lavish 
offices, excessive travel allowances, and other perquisites. The 
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fiscal system of the Board promotes inflated marketing costs. 
Noting these patterns in the marketing system of Africa, some 
observers, and in particularly Frank Ellis of the Economic Research 
Bureau of the University of Dar es Salaam, have gone so far as to 
posit a "law of rising unit costs." "The basic mechanism of the law," 
Ell is writes 
rests in the impact on unit marketing costs of fluctuation in the 
volume of produce handled when the marketing system is 
characterized by high fixed overheads. The effect of a reduction 
in output is to increase the unit costs of marketing in 
approximate proportion to the share of overheads in total costs. 
These higher unit costs are then discounted from the export price 
for the following crop season, resulting in a lower producer 
price than would be warranted by the external market situation, 
and resulting in a further fall in output, There then appears a 
self-perpetuating process whereby the producer obtains a 
progressively smaller proportion of the export price realized by 
the parastatal authority,2 1
Consequences 
While Ellis may in fact be overstating the case, there is 
enough substance to his argument that one must be troubled by it. In 
any case, certain facts are clear, and foremost among them is that the 
system of export marketing serves to lower farm gate prices, Some 
evidence of this is contained in the Appendix, There it can be seen 
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that the domestic prices offered farmers for export crops rarely 
exceed 75 percent, often lie below 50 percent, and not infrequently 
even lie below one-third the level of international prices. Table 2 
presents the results of an analogous exercise, performed by the World 
Bank; the figures represent the ratio of domestic prices to world 
prices, adjusted for the costs of transport, marketing and processing, 
In interpreting these figures, note should be taken of the World 
Bank 's commentary regarding them: 
The actual level of taxation of export crops is higher than shown 
in two important respects. In the first place, the economic farm 
gate value of these crops has been derived on the basis of actual 
marketing costs. These costs are, in most cases, those of 
monopolistic agencies working without competitive pressure, and 
thus are generally inflated. If the marketing cost of an 
efficient marketing system were used instead, the economic value 
of crops would be higher and the degree of implicit taxation even 
greater, The level of taxation is also higher than shown because 
the NPCs do not reflect the influence of over-valued currencies, 
which reduce the proceeds of exports in terms of domestic 
currency. Taking into account the effect of oveTvalued currency, 
producers in a number of countries listed in the table received 
less than half the real value of their crops in recent years,22
From the private producer's point of view, not only does the 
domestic marketing systems for exports lower the price of cash crops; 
TABLE 2 
Nominal Protection Coefficients for Selected Export Crops 
Crop 1971-75 1976-80 
Cocoa 
Cameroons . 3 7 . 4S 
Ghana .47 .40 
Ivory Coast . 56 . 3 8 
Togo . so .2 S  
Coffee 
Cameroons (Arabica) . 72 . 60 
Cameroons (Robusta) . 3 6 
Ivory Coast . 6S . 3 6 
Kenya . 94 
Tanzania .so .59 
Togo .42 . 23 
Cotton 
Cameroons • 79 
Ivory Coast • 79 1.0 S 
Kenya 1. 0 7
Malawi ,6S .75 
Mali . 55 .44 
Senegal • 65 
Sudan • 78 • 70 
Togo .62 • 79 
Upper Volta • 79 
Source: IBRD, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An 
Agenda for Action, Washington, D.C.: IBRD, 1981, p. 56. 
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it also shifts relative prices in favor of the production of other 
commodities. This phenomenon is illustrated in table 3 , which com-
pares the net return of five major export corps in Uganda (cotton, 
robusta coffee, tea, cocoa, and tobacco) with the net return to five 
commodities for which government controls did not exist (maize, mil-
let, beans, groundnuts, and plantains). 
TABLE 3 
Comparative Net Returns of Major Crops 
in 1975 and 1977/7S in Ugandaa 
(Shillings per kilogram, estimated) 
197S 
1. Seed Cotton -1.3 7 
2. Robusta Coffee -0 . 3 8 
3 • Tea (Green Leaf) --0 . 16 
4. Cocoa -0 .2 S 
s. Fire-cured Tobacco N.A. 
6. Maize +O .6S 
7. Finger Millet +1.3 6 
s. Beans +1. 90 
9. Groundnuts N.A. 
10 .  Plantains +l. 0 3  
a • Net returns equals average price less average costs. 
1977/7S 
-3 . 40 
+0 .74 
--0 .3 1 
-0 . 10 
-12.20 
+2 . 07 
+5 . OS 
+5 .OS 
+5 . 64 
+1. 90 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, "Pricing Policy and 
Agricultural Production: Discussion Paper," (Entebbe: Ministry of 
Agriculture and Forestry, August 1978), Appendix I I. 
Non-Bureaucratic Factors 
Thus far this paper has focused on the administration 
regulation of export crops and noted the ways in which government 
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bureaucracies lower the price of export crops and thereby redistribute 
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resources from the farmers to the state and to the bureaucracies 
themselves. Highly important non-administrative systems also operate 
to undermine the incentives for export crop production. Perhaps the 
most significant of these is the exchange rate. 
African currencies tend to be overvalued. Illustrative of 
this is the data in table 4 ,  which shows that on the average the 
thirteen nations studied in 1979 maintained currencies which were 
overvalued by 3 8 percent; data in other sources suggest that this is a 
highly conservative estimate.2 3
TABLE 4 :  Estimates o f  the Overvaluation o f  Domestic Currencies, 1979 
Cameroons 1.0 0 
Ghana 3 .0 0 
Ivory Coast 1.10 
Kenya 1.4 0 
Malawi 1. 0 5
Mali 1. 10 
Nigeria 1. 4 0
Senegal 1.40 
Sudan 1.3 0 
Tanzania 1.50 
Togo 1.10 
Upper Volta 1.10 
Zambia 1. 50 
Source: Doris J. Jansen, "Agricultural Pricing Policy in Sub-Saharan 
Africa in the 1970s," December, 1980 . 
2 0 
The effect of overvaluation is straightforward. By 
maintaining an artificially strong currency, governments lower the 
perceived price of foreign products. But they do so by lowering the 
value (in terms of the domestic currency) of the earnings generated 
abroad by exports; foreign "dollars" convert into fewer units of 
domestic currency, for its value has been set at an artificially high 
level. Another effect of overvaluation is to generate shortages of 
foreign exchange. By encouraging imports and discouraging exports, 
overvaluation insures that more foreign exchange is demanded than is 
earned. 
These effects can be summarized in diagram 1. 
* 
p 
to p - -0 $ 
tl 
pl - $
p Diagram 1 
Qs 1 
QS •QD 0 0 QD 1 
D 
s 
Foreign Currency, $ 
The horizontal axis indicates the quantity of foreign goods, which are 
indexed in terms of dollars ($), demanded or supplied; the vertical 
axis represents their price in terms of domestic currency, here called 
cedis (�). The supply curve is the marginal cost curve of the export 
industry; it shows the amount of exports (or dollars) which will be 
supplied for any given valuation of the local currency. The demand 
curve represents the demand for imports (or foreign dollars) given 
their perceived price in terms of cedis, Overvaluing the cedi (from 
¢0 to ¢1
> lowers the cedi price of the dollar (from P0 to P1). The 
result is to cheapen imports, thereby increasing the demand for them 
(from QD to QD ); to weaken the incentives to export, so that the 0 1 
supply of foreign exchange goes from QS to Q S ; and to create a 0 1 
shortage in foreign exchange or an excess demand for imports 
<°n > Qs 
>
.1 1 
The major implication for export agriculture should be 
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obvious: overvaluing the currency reduces the value of exports and so 
undermines the incentives to supply cash crops for shipment to foreign 
markets, In terms of the diagram, the effect is to shift export 
earnings from QS to QS , This effect is major and profound. The 0 1 
overvaluation of African currencies imposes a tax on export 
agriculture, weakens the incentives for cash crop production, and 
leads to a decline in the production of export and the generation of 
export currency, 
But, in significant ways, the effect of overvaluation goes 
even deeper than this, For overvaluation also tends to increase the 
costs of farmers and to lower the real value of their earnings; and it 
does so while placing farmers under the economic and political control 
of persons with political influence, Overvaluation helps to promote 
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the economic and political bondage of farmers, 
To gain insight into this effect, we may return to diagram 1. 
At the overvalued worth of domestic currency (P1), the quantity of 
foreign exchange demanded (°n ) is greater than the quantity supplied 1 
( QS ); there is thus an excess demand for foreign exchange at the 1 
official price for it (i,e. at the official exchange rate), One 
result of this induced scarcity is to drive up the market value of 
foreign exchange; those who can get it can sell it at a price that 
lies significantly above the official price, As can be seen in 
diagram 1, with QS supplied at the official exchange rate the market 1 
* 
clearing price would in fact be P (i. e. where demand equals supply). 
Another result is that at the official exchange rate demand can only 
equal supply through rationing; fixing the price at P1 maintains a 
condition of excess demand <°n ) QS ) and those in control of 1 1 
allocating foreign exchange can choose those who will -- and will not 
-- get a chance to import foreign goods, 
The consequences are obvious, Those in change of the foreign 
exchange "market" stand to reap enormous rewards from it, If they can 
* 
secure foreign exchange at price P1 they can resell it at P ;
alternatively, if they can import foreign goods at the artificially 
lowered price of P1, they can resell them at the market clearing price 
* 
of P , Moreover, the beneficiaries of this system are those in 
political control, For with fixed prices in the first instance, this 
"market" is in fact not a market at all; the initial allocation of 
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scarce resources takes place through administrative and political 
channels, and only in the second instance -- when the benefits of the 
scarcity are reaped in black markets -- through the establishment of 
competitive prices, 
In this system, the beneficiaries are the Central Bank or 
those who make appointments to it. They are those who sit on the 
foreign exchange allocation committee and the committee which 
allocates import licenses, or those who make the appointments to these 
committees, They are those who receive import licenses, or who 
allocate them. The losers in this system are those who are not 
located in positions of access to this scarce resource and who 
nonetheless must purchase imported goods, 
Typically there are no peasant farmers in the Central Bank or 
on the committee that allocates foreign exchange or import licenses. 
Yet the farmers rely on imports. Hoes, cutlasses, sprayers, 
pesticides, ox plows and implements, sacks and bags, milling machines, 
and so forth: these farm implements are often imported, Moreover, 
shirts, shoes, blankets, soap, batteries, etc. : these consumer goods 
are often imported or are manufactured with imported equipment. But 
given the scarcity of foreign exchange, the value of imports is 
extremely high (p* in diagram l); these imports will only be provided 
if they can command at least that value. The consequence is that the 
farmers must pay a premium to those who secure privileged access to 
foreign exchange or to the imports it can buy, 
Overvaluation thus weakens the incentives to export, It 
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increases the costs of farming and raises consumer prices for farmers. 
And it does so while involving the farmers in a system of regulated 
foreign exchange markets: one in which they are subj ect to political 
and economic domination by persons with influence in the national 
capitol. 
Not only does overvaluation lead to political-economic 
bondage; it can also place very strong limits on export markets. It 
can "squeeze" the farmer and /or the treasury even while providing 
benefits to those who secure imports or foreign exchange at the 
official exchange rate. This can be illustrated with figures drawn 
from the cotton industry in Uganda, 
Say that the world price for seed cotton translated into the 
domestic currency at the official exchange rate was 42 Ush, per 
kilogram. Through the Marketing Board, the government then paid the 
farmer the price of 30 Ush. per kilogram; moreover, it allowed the 
processor a 7.40 Ush, per kilogram mark.up and the Board a charge of 
4.60 Ush, per kilogram to cover its costs. Say that the next year the 
world price was to rise by roughly 20 percent, i. e. to around 50 Ush. 
per kilogram of seed cotton, But say that domestic inflation has been 
in the range of 200 percent, which in fact has been the case in 
Uganda, It can then be seen that maintaining the official exchange 
rate makes it impossible to maintain the former level of incentives to 
grow cotton without significant subsidies from government. The world 
market price is now 50 Ush, per kilogram; but the farmers ' price 
cannot be doubled to offset the effects of inflation, for it would 
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then lie a t  60 U sh. per kilogram. Either the f a rmer mus t be squeezed 
or the treasury mus t pay out s ub sidie s; maint a i ning the exi s ting 
exchange rate either lea ds to l o s se s  by the exp o r ter s o r  by the 
government. 
Were the government t o  dev alue ,  however, then the shil l ing 
price of export s would ri se. Were the government to dev alue by a 
f ac t o r  of three, for example -- a m a gnitude which is not unrea sonable 
in light of  the m a gni tude of other recent dev a l ua tion s o f  the Uganda 
shilling then the selling price of co tton would be 150 U sh. per 
kilogram. The f a rmer s could receive the 60 U sh. per kilogram 
nece s s ary to compens a te them the 200 percent increa se in their co s t s; 
so t o o  could the pr oce s sor s and the B oard, their m arkup s now rising t o  
14.80 and 9 .20 U sh. per kil o gram re spectively. Notwith s t a nd i ng these 
increa se s ,  a s  a consequence of the dev a l ua t i on ,  a surplus of 60 Ush. 
per kilogram of seed cotton would be lef t ove r ,  which coul d either be 
reapportioned among the member s o f  the indu s try or redirected int o  the 
co f fer s  of the government. 
Exp o r t  a griculture and the trea sury thus have an incent ive t o  
ally i n  oppo s i tion t o  the present sy stem ,  one which f av o r s  tho se who 
can ge t impor t s  at their o f f ic i a l  price s and tho se who can t urn the 
sy stem o f  admini s tra tive con t r ol s  to their po l i t ical and eco nom ic 
a dv a nt a ge .  But in m o s t  Africa n  societies ,  the trea sury and the 
expor ter s are unable to ach ieve dev a l ua t i on. Instead,  a s  the above 
figure s sugge s t ,  they are squeezed be tween the r a te at which exp o r t  
e arni ngs are converted into dome s t i c  currency and the r i s i ng t i de s  of 
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dome stic inflation. 
Conc lu s i o n :  
The m arke ting sy stem for export crop s ,  the burden o f  taxa t i on 
and o f  inflated m arke t i n g  c o s t s  born by exp o r t  industrie s ,  and t he 
overv alua t i on of dome stic currencie s all a dver sely af fect the 
economic f ortune s of export crop producer s. In conj unction w i th other 
f ac t or s  -- occa sional drought a nd e nvironment a l  stre s s ,  co st-ri se s 
from the increa sing price of petroleum, and p o l itical unres t ,  to name 
but a few -- the maj or result is that once pro sperous e xport 
indu s t rie s have severely declined. 
Nige r i a :  For ne arly a century , p a l m  oil formed a n  important 
ba s i s  for  N i geria' s  external trade. Early in the twentieth cent ury, 
the B ritish government , with the b acking of Bri ti sh textile intere s t s ,  
const r ucted a m aj or r ailway int o  the Nige r i an interior a n d  s ought t o  
promote the growth of co t t on i n  the nor thern s av a nnah. The N i gerian 
pea santry were more in t ouch with eco nomic rea l ities than were the 
coloni a l  over l ords , however; they exp l oited the econom ic opportunities 
provide d  by the railway to grow groundnut s ins t e a d. Only la ter did 
the pe a s ant s  t urn to the product i on of co t t on and N i geri a  then became 
one of  Africa's maj or exp o r ter s of tha t  crop. But , in recent year s ,  
a s  shown in t a b l e  5 ,  the exp o r t  o f  all three of the se commodi t i e s  h a s  
virtually term inated. 
TABLE 5 
Nig erian Agricul tural Exports 
( 1000 t ons ) 
1 9 7 0  1 97 1  1 9 7 2  1 9 7 3  1 974 1 97 5  
Groundnut s 291 1 3 6  1 0 6  1 9 9  3 0  nil 
Palm Oil 8 20 2 nil nil 3 1  
C o t t on 23 22 1 8 nil nil 
Sourc e :  I nt erna tiona l B ank f or Reconstruction and Dev e l opm e nt , "Ni­
g eria : An Inform a l  B ank Survey . "  Mim e o graphed,  1 97 8 .  
Seneg a l : Fo l l owing the cons truc tion of the railway from the 
coa s t a l  towns of Sene ga l  int o  the int erior, the pea s a nt s  of S e ne ga l  
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1 97 6  
nil 
3 
nil 
ent ere d  int o the produc tion o f  groundnut s f or e xp ort . S e ne g a l  rapidly 
b e c am e  one of Afric a ' s  maj or produc ers of groundnut s and the 
gov ernment deriv e d  ov er 25 perc e nt of it s c apit a l  budg e t  rev e nue s from 
the e xport of thi s c ommodity . From nearly one mil l ion t on s  in 1 96 4-
6 5 , the l ev e l  of e xport s decrea s e d  t o  l e s s  than 5 0  perc e nt of that by 
1 97 2-73 ( t abl e 6 ) . This downt urn b e c am e  known a s  l e  mal ais e p ay s an 
a nd thre a t e ns S ene g a l ' s  e c o nomy . 
Mark e t e d  
Produc tion 
TABLE 6 
Marke ting of Groundnut s ,  1 96 5 /6 6 -1 97 2/73 , S e ne g a l  
( 1000 tons ) 
1 96 5 /  
6 6  
993  
1 96 6 /  
6 7  
7 81 
1 9 6 7  I 
6 8  
83 4 
1 96 8/ 
6 9  
7 81 
1 96 9 / 
7 0  
6 23 
1 970/ 
7 1  
447 
1 9 7 1 /  
7 2  
747 
Sourc e :  Int erna tiona l B ank f or Recons truc tion and Dev e l opm ent . 
Seneg a l : Tradition, Diversific ation, and Ec onomic Deve l opment . 
Wa shingt on, D . C . : World B ank , 1 97 4  
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1 9 7 2/ 
73  
375  
Ghana: Sinc e the early y e ar s  of the twent i e th c e nt ury , Ghana 
ha s b e e n  the worl d ' s  l arg e s t  e xp orter of coco a .  I n  the 1 96 0 s ,  it 
produc e d  n e arly one-ha l f the worl d ' s  t ot a l  crop . It now produc e s  but 
one- third ( s e e  tabl e 7 ) . Fai l ur e  to supp ly farm input s ,  such a s  
p e s ticide s; shortage s o f  l abor; un f av orab l e  pri c e s; and t h e  r e l a tiv e 
a t traction o f  other f orm s  o f  production -- al l have b e e n  cit e d  a s  
po s s ib l e  c a us e s  for the d e c l ine o f  one o f  Afric a ' s  m o s t  f amous 
indu s t ri e s .  
196 9-7 3 a 
Ghana 3 5 5 , 26 2  
Worl d 83 5 , 840 
a. Av era g e  a nnua l 
TABLE 7 
Production of Coc o a  b e ans 
( t ons ) 
1 9 7 3 /74 1 974/75 
3 20 , 5 1 7  3 3 2 , 4 9 9  
7 81 , 8 7 0  7 81 , 3 20 
1 97 5 /76 
3 43 , 03 9  
83 2, 6 5 0  
197 6 /77 
27 0 , 1 92 
7 1 5  , 4 80 
Sourc e :  Int erna tional Cocoa Org a ni z a tion, Quart erly Bul l e tin of Coc o a  
S t atistic s  5 ,  No . 1 ( 1 97 8 ) : 14 .  
Sudan: During the co l onial  era,  B riti sh textile intere s t s
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sought to render the Af rican co l onie s a secure and l ow co st sourc e  o f  
cot t on fibres . His t oric a l ly , the United S ta te s  had p r ovide d  r aw 
materi a l s for  the B ritish textil e indus t ry .  But the America n  Civil 
War,  the growth of the American textil e indust ry , and the infe s t a tion 
o f  bol l weevil -- a l l  threa tene d t he supp ly of  United S t a t e s c o t t o n  t o
B ritish firm s .  I n  response, B ritish textil e intere s t s  l obbi e d  their 
government to turn its over sea s a dmini s t r a tion int o a n  a gency for 
promoting the growth and s upp ly of  co t t o n .  One of  the ear l ie s t  and 
m o s t  f amous proj ec t s which re sul t e d  w a s  the Gezira scheme in the 
Sudan.  In thi s  proj ec t ,  mod e r n  techno l ogy wa s us e d  t o  exp l oit the 
w a te r s  o f  the Nil e and t o  devote the seemingly idl e exp a nse s o f  the 
Sudan interior t o  the p roduction of high grade c o t t on. Th e irri g a te d  
growth of  co t t on i n  the Sudan bec ame one of the m o s t  i l l u s t rious of 
Af rica's a g ricul tur al  proj ect s .  But , in rec e nt yea r s ,  thi s indus t ry 
too ha s s t a gnated ( t ab l e  8 ) ;  and with the rec e nt downturn in co t t o n  
price s ,  cot t on irriga tion in the Sudan f ail s t o  t u r n  a profit . 
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TABLE 8 
Production o f  Seed Co t t on, Sudan 
Area Pr oduction Av e r a g e  Yie l d  
( fedda ns ) ( m e t ric t on s ) ( kg /feddans ) 
-
1 970/7 1  1 , 20 9  , 5  84 7 3 0  , 93 3  6 04 
1 97 1 /7 2  1 , 21 9 , 424 6 85 , 003 5 6 2  
1 97 2/73 1 , 1 7 6 , 8 82 5 5 5 , 6 0 8  4 7 2  
1 97 3 /74 1 , 16 6 , 04 7  6 6 9 , 8 1 5  5 7 4  
1 9 74/75 1 ,  21 9 ,3 91 6 47 , 03 2  5 3 1  
Source: Democ r a tic Repub l ic o f  Sudan. Mini stry o f  Agricul ture, Foo d  
and Natural Re sourc e s . Dep a r tment of  Agricul tur a l  Eco nomic s .  S t a ti s­
tic s Division, Sudan: Yearbook o f  Ag ricul tura l S t a tic s  1 9 7 1 , p .  1 9 ;  
and Current Agricul tura l S t a tic s 1 ,  No . 2 ( June 1 97 6 ) : 3 . 
The dec l ine in the exp o r t s  of Sudane s e  co t t on, Ghanaian coco a ,  
Sene g a l e se groundnut s ,  and Nigerian cott on, groundnut s a nd p a l m  oil 
these r e p r e sent rece s sions in some of the m o s t  signific a nt exp o r t  
indu s t ri e s  in Af ric a . The se downt urns hav e be en countered by the 
p r o s p e ri ty of Af rica's c o f fee indu s t ry; and s ome Af rican na tions , 
not ably the Ivory Coa s t ,  have expa nded their agricul tur al exp o rt s .  
But , a s  s een in t abl e s  9-1 1 , dec l ine, rather than grow th, ha s bee n  the 
more typica l  p a t t e r n .  As th e se tabl e s  show , whil e the v a l ue of 
Africa n  a g ricul tur al  exp o r t s  h a s  ri sen, downt urns in the volume of 
produc tion hav e o f f se t  the e f f ec t  of  price increa se s ,  with the resul t 
that inc r e a s e s  in the  tot a l  value of Af rican a gricul tur al  exp o r t s  hav e 
l ag g e d behind tho s e  of the oth er r e gions o f the worl d .  
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TABLE 9 
Index Numbers of Agricultural Exports, Unit Value 
(1969-1971) = 100 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
World 95 95 93 96 100 104 114 156 208 213 208 237 244 269 295 
Developing market 
economies 94 93 94 96 102 103 110 146 209 208 216 280 269 290 320 
Developing all 94 93 94 96 101 103 110 146 208 209 215 275 266 287 317 
Africa 88 90 92 96 103 101 104 133 184 189 208 310 306 328 339 
TABLE 10 
Index Numbers of Total Agricultural Exports, Volume 
(1969-1971) = 100 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1971 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
World 91 90 93 94 102 104 112 121 115 116 126 130 138 146 154 
Developing market 
economies 94 91 94 98 102 100 107 108 100 101 113 113 113 118 118 
Developing all 96 93 95 99 102 100 107 110 101 102 113 113 115 118 118 
Africa 101 94 100 99 103 98 109 109 103 94 99 86 85 85 84 
Source: FAO, FAO Trade Yearbook 1977, 1980. 
1978, 1981. 
Rome: Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 
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TABLE 11 
Index Numbers of Total Value of Food Imports 
(1969-1971 = 100) 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
World 84 84 84 88 100 111 130 188 254 285 275 294 341 406 483 
Developing 
economies 90 92 93 89 101 110 122 194 324 348 313 354 427 507 693 
Africa 89 87 82 83 99 118 131 189 308 378 323 392 483 527 703 
Source: FAO, FAO Trade Yearbook 19771 1980, Rome; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United 
Nations, 1978, 1981. 
Food C rop s 
Afric an g ov e rnment s also int e rv ene in the marke t for food 
c rops , And ,  once a g ain, they t e nd t o  do so in way s  that l ow e r  the 
pri c e  of  agricul tur a l  commoditie s .  
Afric an gov ernment s s e ek low pric e d  food . One w ay in which 
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they a t t empt t o  d o  so i s  b y  c o n s t ricting bureaucr acies which purch a s e  
f o o d  crops a t  gov e rnm e nt m anda t e d  p ric e s .  A r e c e nt s t udy by the 
Uni t e d  S ta t e s Dep a r tm ent of Agricultur e e xamine d the marke ting sy s t em 
for  food c rops in Af rica a nd di scovered a high incidence of gov e rnment 
m a rk e t  int e rv ention ( t abl e 1 2 ) . In the c a s e  of thr e e  of the f ood 
c rops s t udie d ,  in ov e r  50 p e r c e nt of the count rie s  in which the c r op 
w a s  g r own, the government h a d  impo s e d  a sy s t em of pr oduc e r  price 
cont r ols; and in over  20 p e r c e nt the gov e rnm ent m aint aine d a n  o f ficial 
monopsony for the purch a s e  of that f ood c rop . 
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TABLE 1 2 :  P a t t e rns o f Marke t Int e rv ention for Foo d  Crops 
Crop Countri e s  in Countri e s  with : L e g a l  Mo nopo ly 
Which Crop Produc e r  price Ov e r  Crop 
Is Grown Cont r o l s 
N N % N 
Ric e  2 6  25 96 11 
Whe a t  1 2  8 6 7  4 
Mill e t  and Sor ghum 3 8 9 2 4  7 
Maiz e  3 5  2 4 6 9  9 
Root s and Tub e r s  3 3  6 1 8  1 
Sour c e : Uni t e d  S t a t e s Departm e nt of Agricul tur e ,  Food Prob l em s  and 
Prosp e c t s  in Sub- Saharan Afric a ( W a shingt on, D . C . : USDA, 1 9 80 ) , 
p .  1 7 3 . 
% 
42 
3 3  
1 8  
2 6  
3 
Th e r e gul a tion o f  food m arke t s  e nt ail s pol icing the pur ch a s e  
and mov em ent of  food s t ocks a n d  c o nt r o l  ov e r  t h e  s t o r a g e , proc e s sing , 
and r e tail marke ting o f  food . An illus t r a tion is o f f er e d  by th e m aiz e 
indus t ry of Keny a; a c c o r ding t o  sub s e c tion 1 of s e c tion 1 5  of the 
Maiz e Marke ting Act : 
Al l maiz e grown in Keny a  sh a l l ,  subj e c t  t o  the provision of thi s 
Act , be purch a s e d  by and s old t o  the Board, and shall , without 
prej udic e to the Board ' s  l iabil ity for the pric e pay ab l e in 
a c c o r danc e with s e c tion 1 8  of this Act , r e s t  in the Board a s  soon 
a s  it h a s  b e e n  harv e s t e d . 2 4 
In one of the b e s t  s t udie s  o f  the m aiz e mark e t in Keny a ,  Schmidt no t e s  
th a t  t o  insur e the Maize a nd Produc e Board' s  monopoly po sition a l l  
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movement s o f  maize require a movement permit v alid for  only twenty­
four hour s which must be obt aine d  f rom the MPB or another authorized 
per so n .  The only exceptions are the movement s of maize or m aize 
pr oduct s within the bounda rie s o f  the f arm , the movement of not more 
than two bags ( 180 k g )  accomp a nied by the owner and t he movement of  
no t more than ten bags  within the boundaries o f  a di s t rict accompanied 
by the owner and intended for consumption by the owner or hi s f amily. 
Moreove r ,  the Agricultur al Produce Marketing Act a nd the Maize 
Marke ting Act regul a te the fixing of produce r  price s by the Mini s t ry 
of Agriculture. In addition, the Price Cont r oller, housed in the 
Mini s t ry of Fina nce, fixe s t he depo t ,  whole s ale a nd retail price s for 
m aize and m aize flour.25 The impact of  the se cont r ol s  over the m arke t  
f o r  food c rops i s  prof oun d .  Schmidt records  t w o  m aj or consequence s :
1 .  The c o s t s  o f  marke ting increa se . In p a r t ,  this i s  because 
the government m arke ting b o a r d  i s  le s s  ef ficient than the priv a te 
sec t o r  in the t r anspo r t  and s t or a ge of maize; and in part  it i s  simply 
because the government impo sed b a r rier s t o  ent ry in the m aize m arke t 
confer exce s s  profit s on the a gent s who rem ain within the marke t .  The 
na ture and t he m a gnitude of the se higher co s t s is perhap s m o s t  vividly 
illus t r ated in the ·�ribe c o s t s" which those ope r a ting in the 
regulate d  marke t  c a n  impo se.  To quo te Schmidt: 
B ribing c o s t s were not simply a problem with regard to illegal 
mov ement s of maize and beans .  More than 90 percent o f  the • •
a gent s mentione d  thi s  • in rega rd t o  deliveri e s  t o  [Maize and 
Pr oduce Board] depot s .  In f act , in som e  a rea s the pr oblem w a s  so 
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severe that b ribe s were the m aj or co st i tem for a gent s .  Bribing 
is sometimes nece s s a ry for virtually all steps to ge t m aize int o 
the depo t s :  obt aining movement s ,  pa s sing the g a te ,  pa s sing the 
m oi s t ure te s t ,  ge t ting the lorry of f-loa ded a nd so for th. 26 
2. A second maj or consequenc e  of the regulated m aize m arke t 
i s  price ine f ficiency. Und e r  the present sy stem ,  inter- regional price 
dif ferential s  exceed inter- regional co s t s of t r anspo r t  a nd inter­
tempo r al price dif ferential s  exceed the co s t s  o f  s t o r a ge. The result 
i s  that many consumer s pay higher price s a nd many producer s  receive 
lower price s than would be the c a se were m aize to more ea sily move 
be tween place s and over time. With a more ef ficient m a rke ting sys tem ,  
farm e r s  i n  place s o r  periods o f  surplus could more ea sily consummate 
deals with consumer s in place s or period s  of food deficit , deals f rom 
which both parties could reap a n  a dv a nt a ge. These unconsumm ated 
t r ansactions constitute a loss o f  eco nomic welf are. 
More directly relevant to the conc e rns of thi s  pape r ,  however, 
is the impact of  the f ood m a rke ting c o nt r ol s  o n  producer price s .  For 
insight int o thi s  subj ect we can t ur n  to Doris J an sen Dodge' s s t udy of 
NAMBoa r d, the f oo d  marke ting bureauc r acy in Z ambia. Over the year s  
s t udied by Dodge ( 1 9 6 6 /6 7  t o  1 97 4 /74 ) NAMBo a r d  depressed the price o f  
maize a s  much a s  by 8 5  percent ; that i s ,  in the absence o f  government 
cont r ols over m aize m ov ement s ,  the f arm e r s  could have gotten up to 85 
percent more for their s ale of maize than they were able to secure 
under the marke t cont r ol s  impo sed by NAMBoa r d . 27 Gerrard extends 
Dodge ' s  finding for  Z ambia to Keny a ,  Tanzania and Malawi; Do dge 
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her self extends them t o  eight other Africa n  countri e s . 28 
The primary bene ficiary o f  the regul a tion of food m arke t s  is 
the consumer . This contention can be s t  b e  illus trated by Dod g e ' s  work 
in Z ambi a .  I n  the abs e nce o f  government-priced m aize in Z ambi a ,  Dod g e  
indic a te s ,  local millers would have t o  buy maize a t  t h e  world m arke t 
price; were they t o  o f fer l e s s ,  the f arm er s could t hen m arke t their 
m aize abro a d .  The p arity price -- i . e .  the wor l d  m arke t price a s  i t  
would regi ster in the dome s tic m arke t is pre s e nted in line 1 of  
table 1 3 . With an e xtraction r a te of  1 . 23 6 ,  the co s t s o f  milling ,  and 
a 10 percent ret ail m ark up , the price per 1 0 0  k g .  b a g  of maize mea l 
to the Z ambian consumer ri se s t o  the figure shown on line 4 .  But the 
price act ually charged t he consumer is that shown on line 5 .  As c a n  
b e  seen , the ef fec t  o f  the gov ernment ' s  policy is t o  conf er a subsidy 
of nearly 100 perce nt on the urba n  consum er . 
Dodge ' s  f indings hav e been replic a t e d  in other countri e s ,  both 
in Africa and elsewhere . 29 The se s t udi e s  document that the e f f ec t  of  
the m ark e t regula tions i s  t o  depre s s  the price t o  consumers a t  the 
expen s e  of  the produc ers o f  food,  with the re sul t  of lower 
a gricultural production, lower rural income s ,  and lower rural 
employment . The e stim a t e d  m a gnitude s o f  the s e  e f f ect s for four non-
Africa n  countrie s are pr e s e nted in t a bl e  1 4 . 
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TAilLE 13 : Maize Sub sidi e s  
( Kw acha ) 
1 9 6 6 /6 7  197 0/7 1  1 9 7 3 /74 
1 .  Impor t e d  p arity pric e of maize t o  mil l er 3 . 6 3  7 . 3 9  6 . 44 
2 . Impor t /export parity price of maize 
p er 100 k g  m aize m e a l  a 3 . 9 9  9 . 1 3  7 . 96 
3 .  Mil l ing c o s t s per 100 k g  m aize m e al . 82 . 9 9  1 . 1 0  
4 .  Import /export p arity rettil price
per 100 kg m aize m e al 5 . 29 1 1 . 1 3  9 . 9 7  
5 .  Act ual retail price 5 . 20 5 . 20 5 . 20 
6 .  Sub sidy to co nsumer per 100 k g  m aize m eal . 0 9  5 . 93 4 .  7 7  
7 .  Sub sidy a s  perce nt r e t ail price 1 . 7 1 1 . 4  91 . 7  
Sourc e : Dori s J ansen Dod g e ,  Agricultural Policy and Performanc e  in 
Zambia ( B erkel ey ,  CA : Institute of  Interna tional Studi e s ,  1 97 7 ) , 
p. 1 1 8 .
a .  An e s tim a t e d  extraction r a t e  of 1 . 23 6 . 
b .  Sum of line s 2 and 3 p l us a 10 perc e nt retail margin. 
TABLE 14: Real Effects of Price Distortions, 1976 
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Country Estimated Change Estimated Change Estimated Change in Agricultural Employment 
ARGENTINA 
in Production in Consumption (average coefficients) ( marginal coefficients) 
low high low high low high low high 
------�--'000 metric tons---�------ ---------------full time workers----------------
Wheat -2,343 -7,028 329 988 -19,525 -58,567 -39,050 -117,133 
Rice -20 -59 5 16 -520 -1,534 -1,040 -3,068 
Maize -1,341 -4,083 318 953 -24,585 -74,855 -49,170 149,710 
Beef -273 -820 187 562 -1,638 -4,920 -3,276 -9,840 
EGYPT 
Wheat -255 -786 898 2,748 -18,700 -133,096 -43,180 -133,096 
Rice -1,068 -3,204 466 1,435 -128,160 -384,480 -185,120 -555,360 
Maize -450 -506 388 1,197 -36,000 -40,480 -72,000 -80,960 
PAKISTAN 
Wheat -417 -1,299 577 1,671 -34,333 -106,951 -74,087 -230,789 
Rice -465 -1,394 376 1,128 -44,950 -134,753 -54,250 -162,633 
Maize -5 -15 8 25 -500 -1,500 -800 -2,400 
THAILAND 
Rice -371 -1,165 139 323 -49,467 -155,333 -71,727 -225,233 
Maize 5 16 0 -1 400 1,280 800 2,560 
Sugar 55 166 -37 -112 6,197 18,703 9,295 28,054 
Source: Malcolm D. Bale and Ernst Lutz, Price Distortions and Their Effects: An International Comparison, 
World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 359 (1979) . 
-� 
Thus f ar w e  hav e conc e ntra t e d  o n  the impact of gov ernm ent 
controls on food m arke t s .  But m ark e t  re gula tion i s  not the sole way 
in which African gov ernment s s e e k  t o  lower the price of food . Some 
gov ernm ent s fina nce large- scale production schem e s .  Irriga tion a nd 
riv er ba sin proj ect s  are som e tim e s  us e d  t o  produce food . 3 0  S t a t e  
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farm s ,  farm s e t tlem ent schem e s ,  and prison f arm s are us e d  els ewhere to 
g e nerate food s upplie s . 3 1  Gov ernment s us e rev enue s  to sub sidize the 
co s t s  of farming ; the bar graph b elow docum e nt s the levels of 
f ertilizer sub sidi e s  for selec t e d  c o untri e s  in Africa . 3 2  
Levels of Subsidization of Fertilizer for Various African Nations 
Percent 
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Sources. Ghana: ] .  DirC'k Stryker. "Ghana A)!;riculture . "  Papn prepared for t l 1t' 
West African Regional Projt·c:t. M imeographe<l. 1Y75. 
Nigeria: I nternational Hauk for Reeoustrm:tion and Develup1 1 1e 11 I .  . .  N i)!;eriu: An 
Informal S urvey." Mimeop;raphed. IH78. 
Tanzania : M i n istry of Agricultun• .  Prin• Policy Recor1111wtufotiom for tht· Wl&-
1979 Agr-icultural Price Revieu·, Amwx L M imeop;rapiw<l. W77. 
Zambia: Doris Jansen Dodge. Agriculturul Policy mu/ Pnfonnance in Zambia 
Berkeley, California. I nst i l  ult' of lntnnat ional Studit·� .  I H7i. 
Kenya: Repo,-t of tlae \\tU,-king Pa,-ty ou Agricultural luputs . 1971  
In effor t s  to increa s e  food s upplie s ,  Africa n  gov ernm e nt s  al so 
manipul a t e  trade polici e s . We hav e alrea dy no t e d  that local 
currencie s  are ov erv alued; in the ab s e nc e  of phy sical cons traint s or 
off s e t ting t ariff s ,  the effect is to low er the price of import e d  food . 
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By comparison w i th the m e a sur e s  t a ke n  t o  prot ect dom e stic 
m anuf act uring , government s hav e implem e nt e d  f ew such prot ectiv e  
m e a sur e s  for a gricultur e ;  a s  s e e n  i n  t able 1 5 , in connection with 
other f act or s ,  the effect has b e e n  a bur g e oning growth of food 
import s ,  
Moreov er,  Africa n  gov ernment s of t e n  b a n  food e xport s ;  the 
cons equenc e  is the protection of dom e stic price levels that lie below 
the world m arke t pric e . Illus tra tiv e  i s  the decision taken by the 
Gov ernm ent of  Uganda in 1 9 81 , which I quo t e : 
Export Policy 
At the • • •  m e e ting h eld o n  1 1 th Jun e ,  1 9 81 the Cabine t • •  , 
decide d  a s  follow s : 
1 .  Approv e d  an open door export policy for all product s 
o ther than b e a n s ,  p e a s ,  maiz e ,  sim sim, groundnut s a nd mill e t ,
e xc ept i n  special c a s e s where t h e  product s w ere entirely require d  
for our loc al indu s t ri e s .  
2 .  Agr e e d  that the Mini stry of Commerce should p eriodically 
liai s e  with the relev ant Mini s tri e s  t o  avoid e xc e s siv e 
e xp orta tion of ite m s  which might b e  ba dly ne e d e d  locally at  
particular tim e s .  
3 .  Authorize the Mini s try of Comm erce t o  work o ut in 
consulta tion with the Ministry if Financ e  and Industry ince ntiv e s  
for our e xp ort s .  
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TABLE : .15 
Inde x Numbers of Agricultural Exports, Total Value -
( 1969-1971) = 100 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
World 86 86 86 91 101 108 128 189 237 246 260 295 327 380 441 
Developing market 
economies 89 85 88 94 104 102 117 160 208 211 242 298 301 334 368 
Developing All 90 86 89 95 103 102 11 8 162 211 214 240 293 298 331 364 
Africa 88 84 91 95 106 98 112 144 185 172 207 266 258 271 281 
Source: FAO , FAO Trade Yearbook 1977, 1980. Rome : Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, 
1978 , 1981 . 
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It i s  o ur intention t o  i s sue appropri a te instruc tions t o  a l l  
exp orter s  s o  that w e  s t art pushing o ur exp ort s .  In s o  doing , 
however, we sh al l liai se with you so that we avoid exce s sive ex­
porta tion o f  item s which might be ba dly needed l o c a l ly at  a par­
ticul ar time . 
Clearly , de spite the rhet oric s upporting a gricul tural  exp or t s ,  the 
government of Uganda g ave f ir s t  priority to the l oc a l  marke t .  Simil ar 
bans h ave been p l aced on the export of commodities from other co un­
trie s in order to prevent " shorta ge s "  and t o  hol d down price s in l oc a l  
marke t s . 3 3  
Po litic a l  Origins of Food Po licy 
Wha t  are the source s of government p o l icy t oward f ood crop s ?  
Put b l un t l y ,  food p o l icy apear s t o  repre sent a f orm of po l iti c a l  
se t t l ement , one de signe d  t o  bring pea ce f ul rel a tions be tween African 
government s a nd their urba n  constituent s .  And i t  i s  a se t t lement in 
which the co s t s tend to be born by the f armer s .  
The urba n  origins o f  Afri c a n  food p o l icie s are perhaps m o s t  
c l early seen in Nigeri a .  If  one l ooks a t  the his t ori c a l  origins o f  
government f ood p o l icy i n  N i geri a ,  one i s  drawn t o  the recommenda tions 
of a series of government commis sions -- the Udoj i Commis sion, the 
Adebo Commis sion, and the Anti-Inf l ation T a sk Force s,  for exampl e3 4  
which were impa ne l e d  t o  inve stiga te source s o f  l abor unre s t  a nd t o  
re so l ve maj or l abor stopp a ge s .  The f undament a l  is sue driving urb a n  
unre s t , they noted,  wa s concern with the rea l  v a l ue of  urba n  income s 
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and the ero sion of purcha sing power bec ause of  inf l a tion. While 
recommending higher w a ge s ,  the se c ommis sions a l so no ted that pay 
increa se s repre sented only a short-run s o l ution; in the words of the 
Adebo Commis sion, "It w a s  c l ear to us that , unl e s s  certain recommended 
s teps were t aken a nd a c t ively pur sued ,  a pay aw ard woul d h ave l i t t l e  
o r  n o  meaning . "  "Hence , " in t h e  words o f  the Commis sion, "our 
extraordinary preoc cupa tion with the c ause s o f  the c o s t  of l iving 
situa tion . •P 5  As part of  it s ef f or t s  to confront the c ause of  the 
ri sing c o st of  l iving,  the Commis sion went on to recommend a number of 
ba sic mea sure s ,  among them any propo s a l s " t o  improve the f ood s upply 
situa tion . " The origins o f  many element s o f  Nigeria' s a gricul tural  
program l ie in the recommenda tions o f  the se report s .  
Urban consumer s  in Afri c a  constitute a vigil ant a nd potent 
pre s s ure group dem anding l ow priced f o o d .  Bec ause they are poor, they 
spend much of their income on f ood; mo s t  s t udie s sugge s t  that urba n  
consumer s  in Afri c a  spend be tween 5 0  a n d  60 percent of their income s 
on f o o d . 3 6  In a ddition, the dem and f or m any food crops ri se s even 
f a ster .  This is particul arly the c a se f or milk,  sugar, rice a nd 
whea t . 3 7  Ch ange s in the price of food theref ore h ave a m aj or impact  on 
the economic wel l-being o f  urb a n  dwel l er s  in Africa a nd they pay c l o se 
a t tention t o  the i s s ue of food price s .  Urb a n  consumer s  are potent 
bec ause they are geo graphical ly concentrated a nd s trate gic a l ly 
loc a te d .  Bec ause of their geographic concentra tion, they c a n  quickly 
be org a nized; and bec ause they control such ba sic service s a s  
tran sporta tion, communica tion s ,  they c a n  impo se depriv a tions on 
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other s. They are theref ore i nf l ue nt i al .  Urban unre s t  f orm s  a 
s i gni f i c ant prel ude to change s o f  government s in Afri c a ,  and t he c o s t  
and av ai l ab i l i ty of f o o d  s upp l ies  i s a s i gn i f i c a nt f a c t or promot i ng 
urban unrest. 3 8  
I t  shoul d be noted that i t  i s  not only the worker who c are s 
about food pri ce s .  I t  i s  a l so the empl oyer .  Empl oyer s  c are about 
food pri ce s bec a use f ood i s  a w a ge s  good; w i th hi gher food pri ce s ,  
wage s mus t ri se and, al l el se be i ng equa l ,  prof i t s  f a l l.  Government s 
c are about f oo d  pri ce s  no t only bec ause they are empl oyers i n  t heir 
own ri ght but  a l so bec ause as  owners o f  i ndu s t r i e s  a nd promoter s  o f  
indus tri al  devel opment program s they seek t o  prote c t  i ndustr i a l  
prof i t s. Ind i ca t ive o f  the s i gni f i c a nce o f  the se i ntere s t s i s  that 
the un i t  that se t s  a gri cul tural pri ce s  o f ten re s i de s  no t i n  the 
Mini s try of Agr i cul ture but i n  the Mini s try of Fi nance or Commerce . 
When urba n  unres t  beg i n s  among f oo d  consumer s ,  then, po l i t i c a l  
di s content of ten rapi dly spreads t o  upper echel ons o f  the po l ity: t o  
tho se who se i ncome s come from pro f i t s ,  no t w a ge s ,  and tho se i n  charge 
of m aj or bureaucra c i e s. Pol i t i c a l  regimes that are unable to supply 
l ow cost f ood are seen as da ngerous ly incompe tent a nd as  f a i l ing t o  
prote c t  the i ntere st s o f  key e l ement s o f  so c i al order. In a l l i ance 
w i th the urba n  m a s se s ,  inf l uent i al el ites are l ikely to shi f t  their 
po l i t i c a l  l oyal t i e s  a nd t o  repl ace tho se i n  power . Thus it  w a s  that 
prote s t s  over food shor t a ge s  a nd ri s i ng pri ce s  f ormed a cri t i ca l  
prel ude t o  the coup that un seated Bus i a  i n  Ghana and l e d  t o  the period 
o f  po l i t i c a l  maneuver s and f l ux that threa tene d  to  overthrow the
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government of Arap Moi in Keny a. 
It i s  i roni c ,  but true , tha t  among tho se government s m o s t  
comm i t te d  t o  l ow c o s t  food are the "radi c a l "  g overnment s i n  Afri ca. 
De spi te their s tre s s  o n  econom i c  equa l i ty ,  they impo se l ower pri ce s  on 
the commodi ty from whi ch the poore s t  of the poor -- the pea s a nt 
f armer s -- derive their i ncome s .  A m aj or rea son f or their behav i or i s  
that they are deeply comm i t te d  t o  rap i d  i ndus tri a l iza t i on; moreover, 
they are deeply comm i t te d  t o  hi gher rea l  wage s f or urba n  workers a nd 
have deep i n s t i tut i ona l t i e s  t o  org a nized l abor . 
We c a n  thus unders t a nd the dem and f or l ow c o s t  f ood. It s 
ori g i n s  l ie i n  the urba n  area s ,  i. e. among the consumers. It i s  
s upported by government s ,  both out o f  po l it i c a l  nece s s i ty and, on the 
part of more radi c a l  one s ,  out of i de o l o g i c a l  preference. I t s impe tus 
derives from the f ac t  that food i s  a m aj or s t a p l e  and that hi gher 
pri ce s  f or such s t a p l e s  thre a te n  the rea l  v a l ue of w a ge s  and prof i t s .  
Part i a l ly c o nf irm ing the se content i ons i s  s t a t i s t i ca l  ev i de nce 
co ncerni ng government control s over the ret a i l  pri ce of  ri ce .  Tak i ng 
the presence or absence of ret a i l  pri ce control s f or ri ce a s  a 
dependent v ari abl e, I have taken a s  i ndependent v ari ab l e s  the 
i de o l o g i c a l  preference s of the v ari ous government s , 3 9  data a s  t o  
whether or no t ri ce w a s  a n  urban s t a p l e , 40 and mea sure s o f  the 
dome s t i c  rate of inf l a t i on. 4 1 Empl oy ing these v ari abl e s  in a prob i t  
a na ly s i s ,  I secured resul t s  whi ch sugge st that i n so f ar a s  ri ce i s  a 
s t a p l e  of urba n  consumpt i on, government s are more l ikely to subj ect i t  
t o  ret a i l  pri ce c o ntrol; and the grea ter the rate o f  dome st i c  
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inflation, the more likely were government s t o  a t tempt t o  cont r ol the 
price of rice. Moreover , sociali s t  and Marxi s t  government s were more 
likely t o  impo se price cont r ol s  than were government s o f  no 
di scernible ide ological s t a nce ; capitalis t  government s were le s s  
likely t o  do so . I obt aine d  similar resul t s  for  my analy si s of  
government cont r ol over the ret ail price of  m aize, with one e xception. 
Inflation w a s  not signific a nt. But , intere stingly , a mea sure of the 
concent r a tion o f  urb a n  dwelling w a s ;  the grea ter the propor tion o f  
urba n  dweller s  concent r a te d  i n  the na tion' s  large s t  city ,  the more 
likely the government was t o  have retail price cont r ols for m aize. 
There are thus deep seated political rea sons for  government s 
t o  seek t o  lower the price of food. There are also real limit a tions 
on their ability t o  do so. One limita tion i s  political : inso f a r  a s
f a rmer s them selves a re powerful,  they are likely to resi s t  the e f f or t s  
o f  government s t o  lower agricultur al price s. Only occa sionally , 
however , are f a rmer s powerful. In We s t  Af ric a ,  urban/bureauc r a tic 
elite s have entered rice f arming; and where they have do ne s o ,  they 
have achieved p r o tected c ommo di ty price s and s ubsidized p rice s for 
f a rm input s. 42 In E a s t  Af ric a ,  simil a r  elite s m aintain large-scale 
whe a t  f a rm s ;  they too have employed t heir political influence to avoid 
a dver se pricing p olicie s. But m o s t  f arm s a re owned by member s  of the 
pe a s ant ry ,  not the elite; they a re sm all-scale ,  no t lar ge-scale; and 
the f armer s are politically weak, not s t r ong . Rarely , then, are 
f a rmer s power ful; and most of ten they are t a xe d .  
4 8  
Political influence on the p a r t  of  f armer s thus occ a sionally 
influence s the behavior of government s. A more common influence i s  
the limit a tion o f  government al re source s. When lower price levels a re 
impo sed on f armer s , consumer s m ay face shorta ge s ,  Indeed ,  a s  shown i n  
t a ble 1 6 , food p roduc tion tends t o  b e  highly price ela s tic; a 
nece s s a ry corollary t o  price policies in Af rica m ay therefore be the 
use of public resource s t o  produce or to impo r t  food , But m o s t  
Af rican government s a r e  poo r ,  a n d  m o s t  na tions a re sho r t  of  foreign 
exchange. Government s theref ore lack the reso urce s by which to m ake 
up the shor t f alls resul ting f rom their p ricing p olicies ,  and thi s  
place s a m aj or limita tion on the de gree t o  which they c a n  lower 
a gricultural price s. 
Within the se cons t r aint s ,  the policies o f  Af rican government s 
crea te an economic e nvironment f o r  food production that i s  a dver se t o  
the intere st s o f  f a rmer s. Government s supp o r t  low price policie s a nd 
employ m arke t  cont r ol s  a nd t r a de policies so a s  t o  drive down the 
price s t o  f armer s. As seen in t a ble s 1 7 -1 9 ,  a m aj or consequence m ay 
well be lower p r oduction a nd c o nsumption, Table 1 7 document s the slow 
growth of production over the perio d  1 96 7 -1 97 5 ; table 1 8  document s the 
decline in per capita pr oduction 1 97 5 -1 9 80 ;  and t a ble 1 9  document s the 
resultant decline in consumption over time. 
TABLE 16 : Estimated Price Elasticities 
Kenya 1966-79 Tanzania 1 9 6 4 - 7 8  
Total Production Maize 
Maize . 534 
(3. 75) 
Wheat -. 980 
(-3. 95) 
Rice . . .
Marketed Production 
Maize 1. 149 
(2 . 15) 
Rice 
No estimate available. 
T-statistics in parentheses. 
Wheat 
-
1. 506 
(5. 6 7) 
. . 
. .
. . 
Rice Export 
Crops 
- -. 348 
(-4. 41) 
-. 287 
(-2 . 34) 
. 484 -. 331 
( 4 . 44) ( -4 . 40 )  
. . 
. . .
-1. 126 
(-3. 50) 
Maize 
. 359 
( 1. 50) 
- . 650 
(-1. 16) 
-. 328 
(-1. 55) 
2. 290 
(3. 26) 
-. 954 
(-1 . 77) 
Wheat 
-
-. 989 
(1. 97) 
. . 
. . 
Rice 
-
. 426 
(2. 39) 
. . 
2. 290 
(6 . 11) 
Export 
Crops 
-. 199 
( - 1 .  03) 
-. 027 
(-0. 10) 
-1. 571 
(-2. 79) 
-. 803 
(-1 . 58) 
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Zambia 1905-78 Malawi 1965-71 
Maize Export Maize Export 
Crops Crops 
. 372 -. 469 . 651 -. 393 
(1. 6 7) (-1. 94) (2. 35) (1. 52) 
. 626 -. 941 3. 956 2. 702 
(1. 45) (-1. 97) ( 4 .  33) (-3. 23) 
Source : Christopher David Gerrard , '. 'Economic Development, Government- Controlled Markets, and External Trade in Food 
Grains: The Case of Four Countries in East Africa. " Ph. D. Dissertation , University of Minnesota , August 1981. 
TAB LE 1 7  
Average Annual Growth Rates o f  Product ion , Area and Y i el d  o f  Cereals i n  D eveloping Market 
Economies , by Reg i on , 19 60 - 7 5 , 1 9 6 0 - 6 6 , and 1 9 6 7 - 7 5  
( percen t )  
5 0  
Reg i on Period All Cereals �a) Rice Wheat Coars e Grains 
Produc- Area Yi el Produc- Ar ea · Y ield Produc- Area Yield Produc- Area 
t ion t ion t ion t ion 
1 9 6 0 - 7 5  2 . 9  1 . 0  1 . 9  2 . 4 1 . 0  1 . 4  6 . 6  2 . 7  3 . 9  1 .  7 0 . 2  
As ia 1 9 6 0 - 6 6  0 . 7  0 . 7  -- 0 . 4  1 . 0  -0 . 6  0 . 6  0 . 3  0 . 4  1 . 1  0 . 5  
19 6 7 - 7 5  2 . 7  0 . 8  1 . 9  2 . 4  1 . 0  1 . 4  6 . 9  3 . 2  3 . 7  0 . 9  -0 . 4  
North Africa/ 19 60- 7 5  2 . 3  0 . 5  1 . 8  3 . 0  1 . 2  1 . 8  2 . 9  1 . 0  1 . 9  1 . 3  -0 . 2  
Middle Ea s t  19 60 - 6 6  1 .  7 -0 . 2  1 . 9  5 . 5  2 . 5  2 . 9  1 . 9  O JS 1 . 3 1 . 0  -1 . 4  
19 6 7 - 7 5  1 . 0  0 . 4  0 . 6  -0 . 9  -0 . 5  -0 . 4  2 . 1  0 . 5  1 . 6  -- 0 . 4  
Sub-Saharan 
1 9 6 0 - 7 5  1 .  3 1 . 2  0 . 1  2 . 8  2 . 9  -0 . 1  2 . 5  0 . 3  2 . 2  1 . 1  1 . 0  
Africa 
1960-66 2 . 6  2 . 3  0 . 3  4 . 0  2 . 7  1 . 4  3 . 7  2 . 3  1 . 4  2 . 4  2 . 3  
19 6 7 - 7 5  0 . 5  0 . 6  -0 . 1  1 . 9  3 . 3  -1 . 4  -0 . 8  -2 . 6  1 . 8  0 . 4  0 . 4  
Lat in 1 9 60 - 7 5  3 . 5  2 . 1  1 . 4  2 . 7  2 . 7  -- 1 .  7 1 . 0  0 . 7  4 . 2  2 . 2  
Amer ica 1 9 6 0 - 6 6  5 . 6  3 . 4  2 . 2  3 . 8  4 . 7  -0 . 8  5 . 7  2 . 2  3 . 4 5 . 8  3 . 5  
1 9 6 7 - 7 5  2 . 9  1 . 0  1 . 9  3 . 8  2 . 3  1 . 5  2 . 3  0 . 7  1 . 6  2 . 9  0 . 7  
To tal 1960-75 2 . 7  1 . 1  1 . 6  2 . 5  1 . 2  1 . 3  4 . 1  1 . 6  2 . 5  2 . 3  0 . 8  
Developing 1 9 6 0 - 6 6  2 . 1  1 . 2  0 . 9  0 . 9  1 . 3  -0 . 4  2 . 4  0 . 7  1 . 6 2 . 9  1 . 3  Market 
Economies 1 9 6 7 - 7 5  2 . 4  0 . 7  1 . 6  2 . 4  1 . 2  1 . 2  4 . 0  1 . 5  2 . 5  1 . 4  0 . 2  
Source : Int ernat ional Food Policy Re s earch Ins t itute , Food Needs o f  Developing Countr ies : Pro j ect ion o f  
Pro duc t ivity and Consump t ion to 19 9 0 ,  Res earch Repor t  3 ( De cember 19 7 7 ) , pp . 38-39 . 
( a) Output per h e c t are . 
Yield 
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TABLE 1 8  
Index Numb ers o f  Per Capita Food Production 
(1969-71 = 100) 
1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
World 97 100 100 99 100 101 99 102 103 104 104 105 107 106 105 
Developing 
economies 95 97 97 99 101 100 9 8  100 101 104 105 105 107 107 108 
Africa 96 9 3  99 100 100 100 99 93 98 96 96 92 92 90 91 
Source : FAO, FAO Production Yearb ook 1977 . Rome : Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations , 
1978, pp . 77-78 .  
TABLE 19 
Total Grain Consump t ion Per Cap i t a  
( kilograms ) 
19 69 / 70 19 70 / 7 1  19 71 / 72  1972/73  1973 / 74  
World 310 . 3  309 . 5  314 . 1  315 . 3  322 . 4  
Developing 
market 
economies 186 . 1  188 . 2  185 . 2  182 . 8 186 . 6  
As ia 172 . 7 177  . 4  169 . 1  169 . 2  1 7 7 . 3  
To t al No r t h  Africa/ 
Midd le 
eas t 2 52 . 5  250 . 9  2 5 5 . 1  2 58 . 3  244 . 6  
OPEC 194 . 0  190 . 4  198 . 9  212 . 2  191 . 9  
Non- 2 7 8 . 9  2 78 . 2  280 . 6  279 . 3  2 68 . 8  
OPEC 
Sub - Sahar an 
Afr i ca 14 2 . 5  144 . 8  137 . 0  130 . 0  123 . 1  
Lat in 
America 221 . 6  217 . 0  2 31 . 8  220 . 3  2 30 . 0  
Source : Internat ional Foo d Po l i cy Res earch Ins t i tu t e ,  
DeveloJJlllen t s  i n  Food Consum�t ion : S ome Policy I s s u e s , 
Revised Ed i t ion ( July 19 7 7 ) , pp . 5 3-54 . 
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19 7 4 / 7 5  19 7 5 / 7 6  
304 . 7  301 . 8 
182 . 9  187 . 5  
168 . 0  1 73 . 9  
2 58 . 8  2 58 . 0  
202 . 4  201 . 2  
2 84 . 8  2 84 . 2  
127 . 7  131 . 6  
225 . 8  2 30 . 1  
Recent and Pros2ec t iv e  
Res earch Report 2 ,  
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Concl usion 
This p a p e r  has a r gu e d  that gov ernment po l icy in Af rica t e nd s  
t o  produc e a h a r sh economic e nvironm e nt for  t h e  produc e r s  o f  
a gricul tural produc t s ,  a n d  that a m aj or e f f ec t  m ay well be decline s in 
a g ricul tural produc tion in that co ntinent . Gov ernment bur eauc r aci e s  
cont r o l  a gricultural mark e t s  and s e t  pric e s within them . Comm ercial 
po l icy is manipul a t e d  in way s  that a dv e r s e ly a f f ec t  the incom e s  of 
f arm er s .  Pricing p o l icie s t e nd t o  b e  low price policie s .  A v a ri e ty 
of pr e s sur e s  -- som e  de riving f rom the ne e d  f o r  taxe s a nd for eign 
e xchange; oth e r s  f rom politic a l  pr e s sur e s  brough t t o  b e a r  by organiz e d  
int e r e st s driv e  th e s e  po l icy choic e s .  But the g e n e r a l  r e sul t is a 
weakening o f  the inc e ntiv e s  for a gricul tur e .  
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